I 摘要 随着全球经济一体化与市场竞争的日趋激烈，企业仅依靠自己的力量已无法 在复杂多变的环境中持续发展。越来越多的企业开始寻求供应链上下游成员间的 联盟与合作。过去企业间点对点的竞争逐渐消失，取而代之的是供应链与供应链 间的竞争。因此，研究横向竞争环境下纵向结构与纵向合作契约对于供应链理论 的发展有着推动作用，也对企业进行供应链管理有着重要的现实意义。 本文针对两个制造商和两个零售商组成的排他性供应链与交叉供应链结构， 采用非合作博弈的方法，探讨了创新型企业与回收再制造企业如何在排他性竞争 供应链环境下进行纵向结构的设计，分析了交叉型竞争供应链环境下企业如何与 纵向成员进行合作，并识别了不同纵向结构与不同合作契约对供应链各成员利润 的影响。 首先，考察了二级供应链间竞争时溢出效应对于技术创新选择的影响。之后， 分析了创新驱动下三级供应链间竞争时三种纵向整合策略对制造商利润的影响， 并识别出每种整合策略选择的条件及其均衡特征。研究发现：对于二级供应链， 当产品竞争程度较弱，技术溢出水平较低时，制造商由最初的传统技术生产转变 为技术创新生产，且技术创新策略为占优策略；当产品竞争强度与技术溢出水平 都很高时，制造商由技术创新转变为传统技术生产，且此时传统技术为占优均衡 策略。对于三级供应链，若创新投资成本系数较小，则向后一体化策略为最终的 占优均衡；若创新投资成本系数较大，则向前一体化策略为最终的占优均衡；若 两条链竞争与创新投资成本系数都非常高时，分散化策略为最终的占优均衡策略。 其次，基于排他性竞争供应链市场，以制造商和零售商集中化结构下闭环供 应链模型为基准，考察了分散化结构下不同回收渠道对供应链各成员利润的影响。 同时，构建闭环供应链的直销渠道竞争、分销渠道竞争、混合渠道竞争博弈模型， 识别了直销渠道模式占优的均衡条件，并揭示了回收率、市场竞争强度、再制造 节约成本对均衡渠道选择的影响关系。研究发现：若回收补偿价格较低，且产品 竞争强度弱于某一水平或回收补偿价格较高，且产品竞争强度控制在合适范围内 时，选择制造商回收模式实现了制造商与零售商利润的双赢。而闭环供应链销售 渠道的选择不仅依赖于产品间的竞争强度，同时还受到再制造过程中节约的生产 成本的影响。 接下来，构建两个制造商与两个零售商组成的交叉竞争供应链模型，以传统 的分销模式为基准，考察了平台式销售模式对供应链各成员利润的影响。并识别 摘要 II 了该模型下制造商契约选择的动态演化过程。分析每种契约类型同时实现制造商 与零售商利润改进的条件，博弈均衡特征和局限性。研究发现，当对方零售商采 用传统分销模式与制造商交易时，另一个零售商对销售模式的选择主要取决于产 品间的竞争强度，但也受到零售商店铺间竞争强度的影响。这显著不同于，当竞 争对手采用平台式销售模式，另一个零售商的销售模式选择不依赖于任何因素。 此外，交叉竞争供应链纵向契约的选择也同时依赖于产品间的竞争强度和零售商 竞争强度。且产品间的竞争强度起主导作用，零售商间竞争强度只起到催化剂的 作用。 最后，分析了需求不确定情形下交叉销售供应链契约选择问题。考虑零售商 面对需求不确定会拥有自己的私有信息，制造商作为领导者确定是否通过契约来 获得零售商的私有信息。结果显示，信息分享的两部定价契约在一定条件下对制 造商而言是占优均衡选择，且其固定费用设置在合适范围内时，供应链所有成员 均实现了利润最大化。 关键词：供应链竞争，契约选择博弈，纵向结构选择，需求不确定 ABSTRACT III ABSTRACT With the development of economic globalization and increasingly fierce market competition, enterprises have been unable to develop in the complex and volatile environment by their own strength. More and more companies begin to seek alliance and cooperation with their upstream (or downstream) members. The competition between enterprises is replaced by the competition between supply chains. The research on the vertical structure and the vertical cooperation contract under supply chain competition not only plays an important role in the development of supply chain theory, but also has important practical significance for enterprise’s supply chain management. In this paper, we consider that two manufacturers and two retailers compose the exclusive supply chain or cross supply chain. We discuss how the innovation oriented enterprises and remanufacturing enterprises design vertical structure under the exclusive supply chain. We analysis that how enterprises cooperate with their members under the cross supply chain. We identify the effect of different vertical structure and different cooperation contract on profits of supply chain members. First, this paper investigates the problem of innovation choice game in competing supply chain, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Then, we investigate vertical integration of two competing supply chains, each consisting of a manufacturer, a supplier, and a retailer. Each manufacturer has one of the three strategies: no vertical integration, forward integration, or backward integration. The analysis indicates that for two tires supply chain, when the intensity of competition and spillover effect are under a certain value, the equilibrium choice of the manufacturers would shift from traditional technology to innovation technology. When the intensity of competition and spillover effect exceed a certain value, the equilibrium choice of the manufacturers would shift from innovation technology to traditional technology. For three tiers supply chain, when the intensity of competition is not strong, if innovation investment cost coefficient is low, backward integration strategy is the dominant equilibrium; if the innovation investment cost coefficient is high, forward integration strategy is the dominant equilibrium; when the two chain competition and innovation investment cost coefficient are both very high, diversification strategy as the dominant equilibrium at last. Second, we investigate reverse channel choice under a close-loop supply chain ABSTRACT IV system consisting of two manufactures selling substitutable products to two exclusive retailers. The models under a centralized structure provide a benchmark scenario to compare the ones under decentralized structure with respect to the reverse channel choices of the members in two supply chains. We study how the manufacturer and the retailer make their price decision including the wholesale price, retail price, return rate, and how to choose the marketing channel for the case of product remanufacturing. We find that if the buy-back price is low and the intensity of competition is not sufficiently high, manufacturers and retailers have a win-win by manufacturers collecting model. If the buy-back price is high and the competitive intensity of products is in the moderate range, manufacturers and retailers both have an improvement under collection structure of retailers. The choice of marketing channel for manufacturers and supply chain depend on the competitive intensity of products and the saving cost in remanufacturing. Next, we consider a cross supply chain model of two manufacturers and two retailers, and investigate the impact of the platform-sale on the profit of the supply chain members, and identify the dynamic evolution of the contract selection. We analyze the conditions of the manufacturers and retailers' profit improvement, the game equilibrium characteristics and limitations of contracts. The results indicate that when one retailer uses the traditional distribution structure, the other retailer’s channel choice depends on the intensity of competition between the products and the intensity of competition between retailers. This is significantly different from that when competitors use the platform-sale the retailer's channel choice is not dependent on any factor. What’s more the intensity of competition between the products is the important factor and the intensity of the competition between retailers is only the catalyst for contract choice . At last, we study the problem of contract choice under the cross supply chain with uncertain demand. Retailers face uncertain demands, and demand forecasts are private information to them. Manufacturers, as Stackelberg leaders, can decide whether or not to acquire such private information from retailers through contracts. We obtain the subgame perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for contract choice. We find that the two-part tariff contract is a dominant choice under certain conditions. Specifically, with negotiation of the lump sum payment, all supply chain