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Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms Control
Testimony of Austin Long1
The RAND Corporation2
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
United States House of Representatives
June 21, 2018
n the eight years between the Obama and Trump Administrations’ Nuclear Posture Reviews
(NPRs), U.S.-Russia relations have grown increasingly confrontational, as vividly
demonstrated in the arenas of nuclear forces and arms control. Two events underscore how
dramatically relations have worsened. In April 2010, then–Presidents Dmitri Medvedev and
Barack Obama signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to much fanfare.
In contrast, in March 2018, Medvedev’s successor (and predecessor), Vladimir Putin, revealed
two new Russian strategic nuclear delivery systems not covered in the text of New START.
In this statement, I draw upon unclassified sources to summarize developments in Russian
nuclear forces and strategy over the past eight years as well as some of the factors driving those
developments. I will then discuss the implications of Russian nuclear developments for arms
control.
What Has Happened with Russia’s Nuclear Weapons
Since the signing of New START, Russia has continued modernizing much of its nuclear
arsenal, as succinctly described in the 2018 U.S. NPR.3 Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces have
deployed a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the SS-27 Mod 2, which can be mobile
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as
representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its research.
2 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make
communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit,
nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.
3 U.S. Department of Defense,
Nuclear Posture Review
, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. 8.
Ior silo-based.4 It has also continued development of the SS-X-30 heavy ICBM and has begun or
extended development of two other ICBMs.5
The Russian Navy has deployed a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-
N-32, and a new submarine-launched cruise missile, the SS-N-30A.6 The latter system can
deliver conventional and possibly nuclear warheads; the conventionally armed version has been
used in Syria. In addition to new nuclear delivery systems, the navy has deployed two new
nuclear-powered submarines, the
Borei
-class ballistic missile submarine and the
Yasen
-class
attack submarine; the latter can carry the SS-N-30. The Russian Aerospace Forces have deployed
a new long-range nuclear cruise missile, the Kh-102, and a conventional variant, the KH-101,
and have begun development of a new medium-range missile that is likely to be nuclear
capable.7
As Putin announced in March, Russia also has invested in two novel strategic nuclear
delivery systems. The first is an extremely long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
autonomous underwater vehicle, known as the Status-6 or Poseidon system.8 This system is
capable of striking coastal cities or other targets from transoceanic ranges. The second is an
intercontinental-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, which could hold at
risk much, if not all, of the United States.9
Russia also continues to deploy shorter-range nuclear-capable delivery systems. In addition
to the SS-26 short range missile system, which is deployed in parts of Russia that border the
territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. government in 2014
declared Russia to be testing an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile in violation
4 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat
, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio, 2017, p. 26. The SS-27 Mod 2 carries multiple independently targetable warheads and is known in
Russia as the RS-24 Yars.
5 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017, p. 29. The SS-X-30 is known in Russia as the RS-28
Sarmat.
6 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017, pp. 30 and 37; and U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 8.
The SS-N-32 is known in Russia as the RSM-56 Bulava, and the SS-N-30A is known as the 3M-14 Kalibr or
Biryuza.
7 U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2017, p. 30.
8 Sputnik News, “‘Doomsday Machine’: Russia’s New Weapon Reportedly Gets Nuclear Warhead (VIDEO),”
webpage, May 17, 2018. As of June 18, 2018: https://sputniknews/russia/201805171064549993-russia-
poseidon-system-torpedo/
9 Defence Blog, “New Russian Intercontinental Cruise Missile May Endanger US National Interests,” webpage,
March 25, 2018. As of June 18, 2018: http://defence-blog/news/new-russian-intercontinental-cruise-missile-
may-endanger-us-national-interests.html. The missile has been named
Burevestnik
(literally “messenger of the
storm”).of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.10 The United States subsequently
claimed that Russia was deploying this missile, known as the SSC-8.11
While Russia and the United States are both engaged in nuclear modernization—as their
respective arsenals still rely on systems built during the Cold War—Russia’s modernization is
much further along. Russia is also expanding its arsenal to include new systems, such as the two
novel delivery systems Putin revealed in March and the alleged INF-violating SSC-8. In contrast,
U.S. nuclear modernization concentrates on replacement, rather than expansion.12 The next
section addresses how Russian leaders might think about using this diverse and modernizing
arsenal.
What is Russian Nuclear Strategy
Over the past several years, and especially since the release of the 2018 NPR, the nature of
Russian nuclear strategy has been a topic of intense debate. On one side of the debate is a view
that characterizes Russian nuclear strategy as willing, perhaps even eager, to use the threat of
limited nuclear escalation for purposes of coercion. The NPR states
Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses
of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or
actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on
terms favorable to Russia.13
Proponents of this view highlight certain aspects of Russia’s professional military debates on
nuclear weapons as well as Russian nuclear activities (including exercises) and messages during
and after the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea.14 This view is sometimes re