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iii
Preface
The U.S. Navy’s operational supply capability is currently supported by several information
systems—systems that are antiquated, stovepiped, decentralized, and increasingly expensive to
maintain. As a result, the Navy seeks to modernize the afloat and ashore operational supply
capabilities to achieve a more-integrated supply system that can provide enterprise-level
visibility of supply and minimize sustainment costs.
The Navy asked the RAND Corporation to assist with the Analysis of Alternatives for
modernization of the future supply operations program, Naval Operational Supply System. This
report discusses the results of that analysis, which was conducted from January 2017 to June
2017. This report should be of interest to those conducting naval operational fleet logistics, as
well as analysts and managers of Defense Business Systems.
This research was sponsored by the Navy’s Program Manager, Warfare 150, and conducted
within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research
Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine
Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on the RAND Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, see
/nsrd/ndri/centers/atp or contact the director (contact information is provided on
the webpage).
iv
Contents
Preface .. iii
Figures ... v
Tables .... vi
Summary .......... vii
Acknowledgments ........ xv
Abbreviations .. xvi
1. Introduction .... 1
Background .... 1
Analytic Process ......... 3
Organization of This Report .... 5
2. Alternatives Selected and the Process of Refining Them ......... 6
Status Quo ...... 6
COTS . 7
GOTS . 8
Hybrid .......... 11
Chapter Summary ..... 14
3. Effectiveness Analysis Results .......... 16
Requirements and Quality Attributes . 16
Requirements Analysis .......... 17
Quality Attribute Analysis ..... 21
Chapter Summary ..... 23
4. Cost Analysis Results ........... 25
Ground Rules and Assumptions ........ 25
Cost Summaries ........ 26
5. Risk Analysis Results ........... 28
Risk Analysis Element Definitions .... 28
Risk Analysis Approach ........ 31
Risk Analysis Results33
Chapter Summary ..... 35
6. Conclusions .. 36
Nine Alternatives Identified for Assessment .. 36
Conclusion .... 39
References ........ 40
v
Figures
Figure 1.1. Future of NTCSS ...... 3
Figure 1.2. Analytic Approach .... 4
Figure 2.1. Number of Alternatives Considered Initially and After Refinement... 6
Figure 2.2. Comparison of Alternative 3 (COTS) and Alternative 9 (Second Hybrid) ... 12
Figure 2.3. Alternative 9 with Multiple System Components .... 14
Figure 3.1. Clustered RFI Responses .... 20
Figure 5.1. Risk Matrix as Defined in DoD’s
Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management
Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs
.. 29。